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Abstract: 
This paper presents results from a prisoner’s dilemma game experiment with a third party 
punisher. Third party punishment was frequently observed, in line with previous studies. Despite 
the prevalence of punishment, having one third party punisher in a group did not make one’s 
defection materially unbeneficial because of the weak punishment intensity observed. When a 
third party player’s action choice was made known to another third party player in a different 
group, however, third party punishment was sufficiently strong to transform the dilemma’s 
incentive structure into a coordination game, through which cooperation norms can be 
effectively enforced. 
JEL classification: C92, D01, H49  
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1.  Introduction 
One well-known and consistent finding in recent decades is that some people display 
other-regarding preferences, such as inequity aversion, when interacting with others. A large 
body of experimental research has shown that even third parties, who are not directly involved in 
the relevant interactions, frequently impose punishment when they encounter unfair economic 
behavior in dilemma games (e.g., Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004; Lergetporer et al., 2014; Kamei, 
forthcoming).  
Most research in this area to date found that while third party punishment is frequently 
observed, it is much weaker than direct punishment (e.g., Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004). This 
paper experimentally studies how the visibility of third parties’ punitive actions may affect their 
punishment behaviors. This research question is motivated by past work proposing that the 
visibility of actions enhances people’s pro-social behavior through image motivation (see, e.g., 
Bénabou and Tirole (2006) for a theoretical model, and Ariely et al. (2009) for experimental 
evidence on charitable giving). It is also motivated by the research which suggests that 
increasing the visibility of actions within a group may affect people’s altruistic tendencies in the 
ongoing interactions (see, e.g., Sell and Wilson (1991) for the impact of individualized, instead 
of aggregate, information on voluntary contributions to public goods, and Kamei and Putterman 
(2015) for direct higher-order punishment in a public goods game). High visibility of action 
choices may trigger social effects, such as shame and pride (e.g., Bowles and Gintis, 2005), 
potentially influencing third parties’ punishment behaviors.  
In the experiment, there are two players that engage in a one-shot prisoner’s dilemma 
game with each other (PD players, hereafter), and a third party player who decides how to 
impose sanctions on the PD players in each group. The results demonstrate that the punishment 
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intensity on a norm violator is much stronger when each punisher’s action choice is made known 
to another punisher, than when the punitive actions are kept private. Moreover, in the high 
visibility condition, the third party players almost completely refrain from perverse punishment 
of cooperators. These findings suggest that raising the visibility of third parties’ punitive actions 
can be a powerful device for disciplining their sanctioning activities. 
2.  Experimental Design and Hypotheses 
 This study is based on a prisoner’s dilemma game with a third party player (Fehr and 
Fischbacher, 2004). There are two treatments, namely the “Standard” and “Visibility” treatments, 
implemented using a between-subjects design. Experimental points are converted into pounds 
sterling at a rate of five points to £1.  
2.1. The Standard Treatment 
At the onset of this treatment, subjects are randomly assigned to a group of three so that 
each group has two PD players and one third party player. There are two stages. In Stage 1, PD 
players are each endowed with 25 points and simultaneously decide whether to send 10 points to 
their counterparts. If a subject sends 10 points to her counterpart, the counterpart receives 30 (= 
3×10) points and the remaining 15 points become the sender’s payoff. If the subject does not 
send 10 points, she retains the full endowment as her payoff. Hereafter, we call a subject who 
sends (does not send) 10 points a “cooperator” (“defector”). The third party player in each group 
is not involved in the prisoner’s dilemma interaction.  
In Stage 2, each third party player receives an endowment of 40 points and makes 
punishment decisions for their respective group. Punishment points assigned to each PD player 
must be an integer between 0 and 20. For each punishment point assigned to a target, one point is 
deducted from the third party player’s payoff and three points are deducted from the target’s 
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payoff. Each punisher makes the following four decisions using the strategy method (punishers 
make decisions before being informed of the first stage outcome): 
 
Scenario CC: Punishment points targeted at a cooperator who interacted with another 
cooperator; 
Scenario DC: Punishment points targeted at a defector who interacted with a cooperator; 
Scenario CD: Punishment points targeted at a cooperator who interacted with a defector; 
Scenario DD: Punishment points targeted at a defector who interacted with another defector. 
 
After third party players complete four decisions, their choices corresponding to the 
realized PD players’ sending decisions are applied.  
Standard theory predicts no punitive behaviors of third parties because punishment is 
privately costly. As shown in Appendix C.1, however, the inequity aversion model of Fehr and 
Schmidt (1999) suggests that (a) a third party player i punishes a defector in Scenario DC if i 
exhibits sufficiently strong aversion to disadvantageous inequality (i.e., 𝛼𝑖 > 1 −
𝛽𝑖
2
), and (b) i 
even punishes a cooperator in Scenario CC if i exhibits much stronger aversion to 
disadvantageous inequality (i.e., 𝛼𝑖 > 2).  
2.2. The Visibility Treatment 
The Visibility treatment is identical to the Standard treatment, except that each third party 
player is randomly and anonymously paired with another punisher in a different group, akin to an 
enforcement team, and their respective punishment behavior is made known to the partner. This 
visibility condition is common knowledge to all subjects. Even though two third parties are put 
in a team, they act independently to make punishment decisions toward different PD players. 
There is real-world relevance here: for instance, individuals who work in public enforcement 
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usually share reports with other officers working in the same role in the event of encountering 
law violators. 
If i has (non-strategic) image motivation (e.g., Ariely et al., 2009; Bénabou and Tirole, 
2006), i may punish a cooperator less in Scenario CC and punish a defector more in Scenario DC 
in the Visibility than in the Standard treatment. As we can reasonably assume that a non-trivial 
fraction of subjects are concerned about their image, we can formulate the following hypotheses 
in the paper: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Punishment strength in Scenario CC is weaker in the Visibility than in the 
Standard treatment. 
Hypothesis 2: Punishment strength in Scenario DC is stronger in the Visibility than in the 
Standard treatment. 
 
The Fehr-Schmidt model also predicts Hypothesis 1, because as illustrated in Appendix 
C.2, inequality averse i’s punishment strength in Scenario CC would be positively correlated 
with i’s beliefs on her matched punisher j’s punishment strength in this scenario. This implies 
that i may refrain from engaging in punishment of cooperators in Scenario CC, considering that 
usually only a minority of subjects commit such anti-social punishment (thus i would form a 
belief that her counterpart is less likely to punish cooperators). The model does not, however, 
predict Hypothesis 2. This is because (a) i’s disutility resulting from inequality with someone in 
j’s group increases if i attempts to match her punishment with j’s strength in Scenario DC (note 
that α ≥ β), and (b) when i makes punishment decisions in Scenario DC, j does not necessarily 
confront with Scenario DC(CD) – he may also confront with Scenario CC or DD with some 
probability (see the Appendix for the detail).   
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In the experiment, the identities of all subjects are not disclosed in order to measure the 
pure impact of high visibility on third parties’ punishment behaviors. 
2.3. Experimental Procedure 
Four sessions were conducted at the EXEC laboratory at the University of York in 
December 2015 and February 2016. A total of 96 students (48 students per treatment) 
participated in the experiment. No subjects participated in more than one session. All 
experiments except instructions were programmed using the z-Tree software (Fischbacher, 2007). 
The instructions and verbal explanations in the experiment were neutrally framed.  
3. Results 
 PD players’ cooperation rates were the same for the two treatments at 71.9% (23 out of 
32 PD players). This implies that PD players did not expect changes in visibility would affect 
third parties’ behaviors. Third parties’ punishment behaviors, however, were very different 
between the treatments.  
3.1. Punishment Decisions of Third Party Players 
The pattern of punishment replicates that of past research. Fig. 1 indicates that third party 
punishment is common, and that both its frequency and strength are much higher in Scenario DC 
than in any other scenario.1 This pattern resonates with the idea that people are inequality-averse 
and that third party players attempt to mitigate income inequality by inflicting punishment. 
A comparison between the treatments provides two intriguing findings, each of which 
supports our hypothesis (Fig. 1). First, third party players are significantly less likely to impose 
punishment on a cooperator in the Visibility than in the Standard treatment, regardless of 
                                                          
1 The frequency of punishment in Scenario DC is significantly higher than that in Scenarios CC and CD in the 
Visibility treatment (Appendix Table A.1). The punishment intensity in Scenario DC is significantly stronger than 
that in Scenarios CC and CD in both the treatments (Appendix Table A.2). 
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whether her partner is a cooperator or a defector (panel(A)). Second, the average punishment 
points imposed on a defector in Scenario DC are 6.63 in the Visibility treatment, which is more 
than double of those realized in the Standard treatment (3.00 points) [panel(B)].  
 
Result 1: Raising visibility on punitive actions not only nearly eliminates punishment of 
cooperators completely, but it also substantially enhances punishment of defectors in Scenario DC. 
3.2. Incentive Changes with Punishment 
Third party punishment in the Visibility treatment changes the incentive structure that a 
PD player faces. Fig. 2 shows the payoff matrix of the PD player after deducting the average 
punishment amounts. In the Standard treatment, the average realized payoff matrix is still a 
prisoner’s dilemma because punishment in Scenario DC is not sufficiently strong (panel(I)). In 
the Visibility treatment, however, the average realized matrix is a coordination game, where both 
mutual cooperation and mutual defection are Nash Equilibria (NEs), because of Result 1 
(panel(II)). 
As explained, the fractions of cooperators were identical across the two treatments. One 
may wonder then how PD players’ cooperation would evolve in each treatment if they repeated 
the interactions with different players. Assuming a random matching protocol, we can explore 
this question by calculating PD player i’s per-period expected payoff when selecting to cooperate 
or defect, based on the realized fraction of cooperators and average punishment strength (Table 
1). First, in the Standard treatment, the expected payoff when a subject chooses to cooperate is 
13.7% lower than when she chooses to defect. This suggests that PD players’ interactions could 
converge to mutual defection in repeated interactions, consistent with the analysis in Fig. 2. 
Second, and by sharp contrast, in the Visibility treatment, the expected payoff from cooperating 
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is 19.4% higher than that from defecting. This suggests that, with the aid of higher visibility, PD 
players’ interactions could converge to the mutual cooperation equilibrium through repetition.  
 
Result 2: (i) The incentive structure that PD players face is a coordination game in the Visibility 
treatment. (ii) The expected payoff of a PD player in the Visibility treatment is higher when she 
selects to cooperate than otherwise. 
4. Conclusions 
This paper showed that when the punitive action of a third party player is made known to 
another punisher, punishment not only becomes better targeted, but punishment of a norm 
violator also becomes stronger. We further demonstrated that the high punishment visibility can 
change the incentive structure for PD players, through which mutual cooperation becomes an 
equilibrium for the monetary payoff and selecting to cooperate becomes a materially beneficial 
strategy. These findings underscore the importance of high visibility in regulating third parties’ 
effective sanctioning activities.  
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Fig. 1: Frequency of Punishment, and Punishment Strength 
    
 
(A) Frequency of punishment 
  
 
(B) Average punishment points received by PD players 
 
Note: p-values in panels (A) and (B) are for two-sided Fisher’s exact tests and two-sided Mann-Whitney tests, 
respectively.  
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Fig. 2: Incentive Changes with Punishment 
 
 
Cooperate Defect 
  
Cooperate Defect 
 
 Cooperate 41.44 12.19 
 
Cooperate 45.00 14.63 
 
 Defect 46.00 19.19 
 
Defect 35.13 18.81 
 
 
(I) the Standard treatment                            (II) the Visibility treatment 
 
Notes: The payoffs of the row player (PD player) when punishment amounts are subtracted from the Stage 1 payoffs. 
The shaded cells indicate NEs. 
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Table 1: Average Expected Payoff of Subject i when Choosing to Cooperate or Defect 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       
i’s action choice: Cooperate   Defect   
i’s counterpart j’s action choice:  Cooperate Defect  Cooperate Defect 
  [Scenario CC] [Scenario CD]  [Scenario DC] [Scenario DD] 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
       
       
(i) Subject i’s payoff in Stage 1 ---- 45 15 ---- 55 25 
     
(ii) Subject i’s payoff in Stage 1 minus average punishment amount subject i would receive 
    
Standard treatment ---- 41.44 12.19 ---- 46.00 19.19 
       
Visibility treatment  ---- 45.00 14.63 ---- 35.13 18.81 
       
       
(iii) Subject i’s expected payoff after Stage 2 [line (ii)  percentage of cooperators or defectors for columns (1) to (4)] 
       
Standard treatment  33.21 29.78 3.43 38.46 33.06 5.40 
       
Visibility treatment  36.46 32.34 4.11 30.54 25.25 5.29 
       
       
 
 
Note: The numbers in bold are i’s expected payoffs when i chooses to cooperate or defect.  
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Appendix A: Additional Tables 
Table A.1: The Differences in the Frequency of Third Party Punishment between Scenarios 
(supplementing Fig. 1(A) of the paper) 
 
a. The Standard Treatment 
 Scenario CC Scenario DC Scenario CD Scenario DD 
Scenario CC --- .3603 1.0000 .5322 
Scenario DC --- --- .5487 .7773 
Scenario CD --- --- --- .7572 
Scenario DD --- --- --- --- 
 
 
b. The Visibility Treatment 
 Scenario CC Scenario DC Scenario CD Scenario DD 
Scenario CC --- .0014*** 1.0000 .0287** 
Scenario DC --- --- .0073*** .3918 
Scenario CD --- --- --- .1074 
Scenario DD --- --- --- --- 
 
 
Notes: Two-sided Fisher’s exact tests.  The numbers in these tables are two-sided p-values. 
  *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10 percent level, at the 5 percent level and at the 1 percent level, 
respectively.  
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Table A.2: The Differences in Average Third Party Punishment Point between Scenarios 
(supplementing Fig. 1(B) of the paper) 
 
 
(I) The Standard Treatment 
 Scenario CC Scenario DC Scenario CD Scenario DD 
Scenario CC --- .0394** .6045 .1716 
Scenario DC --- --- .0367** .4188 
Scenario CD --- --- --- .0481** 
Scenario DD --- --- --- --- 
 
 
(II) The Visibility Treatment 
 Scenario CC Scenario DC Scenario CD Scenario DD 
Scenario CC --- .0007*** .3173 .0088*** 
Scenario DC --- --- .0009*** .0021*** 
Scenario CD --- --- --- .0149** 
Scenario DD --- --- --- --- 
 
Notes: Two-sided Wilcoxon signed ranks tests.  The numbers in these tables are two-sided p-values. 
  *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10 percent level, at the 5 percent level and at the 1 percent level, 
respectively.  
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Appendix B: Instructions Used in the Experiment 
Loaded words, such as “cooperate” and “punish,” were avoided in the instructions. 
B.1. The Standard treatment 
[The following are the instructions used in the Standard treatment. The instructions were read 
aloud to subjects by the researcher at the onset of the experiment:] 
At the beginning of this experiment, all members in your group are randomly assigned 
identification numbers 1, 2 and 3. That is, each member is assigned either number with a 
probability of 1/3 (= 33.3%). The same numbers will not be assigned to 2 members in a group. 
We call a subject who is assigned number k “player k.” In each group, 3 members are named as 
player 1, player 2 and player 3. This experiment consists of 2 phases. 
Phase 1 
In this phase, each of player 1 and player 2 is assigned an endowment of 25 points, and 
simultaneously decides whether or not to send 10 points to each other. If player 1 sends 10 points 
to player 2, the 10 points will be tripled and becomes earnings of player 2. Likewise, if player 2 
sends 10 points to player 1, the 10 points will be tripled and becomes earnings of player 1.  
There are 4 possible situations. 
(a) Both player 1 and player 2 send 10 points to their counterparts. In this situation, each player 
obtains 25 – 10 + 3 × 10 = 45 points. 
(b) Player 1 sends 10 points to player 2, but player 2 does not send 10 points to player 1. In this 
situation, the earnings of player 1 are 25 – 10 = 15 points. The earnings of player 2 are 25 – 0 + 3 
× 10 = 55 points. 
(c) Player 2 sends 10 points to player 1, but player 1 does not send 10 points to player 2. In this 
situation, the earnings of player 1 are 25 – 0 + 3 × 10 = 55 points. The earnings of player 2 are 25 
– 10 = 15 points. 
(d) Neither player 1 nor player 2 sends 10 points to her counterpart. In this situation, player 1 and 
player 2 each obtain earnings of 25 – 0 = 25 points. 
You are not allowed to communicate with anyone during the decision stage. As indicated in the 
calculations above, your own earnings will be maximized when you do not send 10 points but 
your counterpart sends 10 points. However, if both player 1 and player 2 send 10 points to each 
other, the total earnings of the 2 players will be maximized and will be 45 × 2 points = 90 points; 
5 
 
and each player obtains 45 points as earnings. Your earnings will be minimized if you send 10 
points to your counterpart but your counterpart does not send 10 points to you. 
While players 1 and 2 decide whether or not to send 10 points, player 3 is asked to answer how 
many persons among players 1 and 2 in his/her group (= 0, 1, 2) he or she thinks will send 10 
points to their counterparts. The response of player 3 to this question will not affect his or her 
earnings in the experiment. 
Any questions? 
Instructions for Phase 2: 
 
In this phase, player 3 is given an opportunity to reduce earnings of players 1 and 2. In this 
phase, player 3 is assigned an endowment of 40 points. 
Each reduction point player 3 allocates to reduce someone’s earnings reduces player 3’s 
earnings by 1 point and reduces that individual’s earnings by 3 points. The reduction points 
to each player (player 1 or player 2) must be an integer. They must also be less than or equal to 
20. 
Player 3 will be asked to make decisions for the following four scenarios: 
(a) how many reduction points player 3 would like to assign to a player that sent 10 points to his 
or her counterpart when the counterpart also sent 10 points to that player 
(b) how many reduction points player 3 would like to assign to a player that did not send 10 
points to his or her counterpart when the counterpart sent 10 points to that player 
(c) how many reduction points player 3 would like to assign to a player that sent 10 points to his 
or her counterpart when the counterpart did not send 10 points to that player 
(d) how many reduction points player 3 would like to assign to a player that did not send 10 
points to his or her counterpart when the counterpart also did not send 10 points to that player 
The reduction points to a player must be an integer. They must also be less than or equal to 20. 
One of the four decisions will be applied for player 1 and player 2 based on the two players’ 
actual sending decisions. Player 3 will be informed of the actual sending decisions of player 1 
and player 2 in Phase 1 at the end of the experiment. 
How to calculate earnings: 
 
Earnings of player 1 are calculated as: 
Player 1’s earnings in Phase 1 
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minus 
 
Reduction amounts received from player 3  
 
If the earnings are negative, then, the earnings will be 0. Earnings of player 2 are calculated with 
the same formula. 
Player 3 obtains earnings of: 
40 – reduction points assigned to player 1 – reduction points assigned to player 2. 
 
Comprehension Questions: 
 
1.  At the beginning of the experiment, you are assigned either players 1, 2 or 3. Answer the 
following questions. 
 
(a) What is the probability that you are assigned a role of player 1? 
[                                               ] 
 
(b) What is the probability that you are assigned a role of player 3? 
[                                               ] 
 
2. Suppose that player 1 in a group sends 10 points to player 2, and player 2 does not send 10 
points to player 1. What are the interim earnings of player 1? What are the interim earnings of 
player 2? 
 
[                                               ] 
 
3. Suppose that player 3 decides to impose 3 reduction points to a member. How many points are 
deducted from the earnings of the target? How many points are deducted from the earnings of 
player 3? 
 
Any questions? Once all questions are answered, we will start the experiment. 
 
[Subjects were asked to answer these control questions. After that, the experimenter explained 
the answers using a whiteboard in order to make sure that the subjects understood the experiment 
fully.]  
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 B.2. The Visibility treatment 
[The following are the instructions used in the Visibility treatment. The instructions were read 
aloud to subjects by the researcher at the onset of the experiment:] 
At the beginning of this experiment, you will be randomly broken into 2 groups, Group A and 
Group B. Individuals put into Group A will be further broken into sets of 2 individuals and will 
be given identification numbers of 1 or 2. Individuals put into Group B will also be further 
broken into sets of 2 individuals and will be given identification numbers of 3 or 4. You will be 
put into Group A and Group B with a probability of 66.7% and 33.3%, respectively. We call a 
subject whose identification number is k “player k.” This experiment consists of 2 phases.  
In Phase 1, player 1 and player 2 are randomly matched and interact with each other. Player 3 
and player 4 are randomly matched and act as a team. Player 3 is assigned to a set of 2 
individuals in Group A (player 1 and player 2) and observes their interaction while player 4 
observes the interaction of another set of 2 individuals from Group A. Each set of 2 individuals 
in Group A is observed only by one individual in Group B. In Phase 2, player 3 and player 4 are 
asked to make some decisions related to their observations in Phase 1. Thus, each interaction unit 
in this part consists of three participants: two members (player 1 and player 2) of Group A and 
one member (either player 3 or 4) of Group B. The following are the details of Phase 1 and Phase 
2. 
Phase 1 
In this phase, each of player 1 and player 2 is assigned an endowment of 25 points, and 
simultaneously decides whether or not to send 10 points to each other. If player 1 sends 10 points 
to player 2, the 10 points will be tripled and becomes earnings of player 2. Likewise, if player 2 
sends 10 points to player 1, the 10 points will be tripled and becomes earnings of player 1.  
There are 4 possible situations. 
(a) Both player 1 and player 2 send 10 points to their counterparts. In this situation, each player 
obtains 25 – 10 + 3 × 10 = 45 points. 
(b) Player 1 sends 10 points to player 2, but player 2 does not send 10 points to player 1. In this 
situation, the earnings of player 1 are 25 – 10 = 15 points. The earnings of player 2 are 25 – 0 + 3 
× 10 = 55 points. 
(c) Player 2 sends 10 points to player 1, but player 1 does not send 10 points to player 2. In this 
situation, the earnings of player 1 are 25 – 0 + 3 × 10 = 55 points. The earnings of player 2 are 25 
– 10 = 15 points. 
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(d) Neither player 1 nor player 2 sends 10 points to her counterpart. In this situation, player 1 and 
player 2 each obtain earnings of 25 – 0 = 25 points. 
You are not allowed to communicate with anyone during this decision stage. As indicated in the 
calculations above, your own earnings will be maximized when you do not send 10 points but 
your counterpart sends 10 points. However, if both player 1 and player 2 send 10 points to each 
other, the total earnings of the 2 players will be maximized and will be 45 × 2 points = 90 points; 
and each player obtains 45 points as earnings. Your earnings will be minimized if you send 10 
points to your counterpart but your counterpart does not send 10 points to you. 
While players 1 and 2 decide whether or not to send 10 points, players 3 and 4 are asked to 
answer how many persons among players 1 and 2 in their interaction unit (= 0, 1, 2) they think 
will send 10 points to their counterparts. The response of player 3 and player 4 to this question 
will not affect his or her earnings in the experiment.  
Any questions? 
Instructions for Phase 2: 
 
In this phase, player 3 and player 4 are given an opportunity to reduce earnings of players 1 and 
2 in their interaction units. (The 2 persons whose earnings player 3 can reduce are different from 
the 2 persons whose earnings player 4 can reduce.) At the end of their reduction decisions, player 
3 will be informed of what reduction points his partner (i.e., player 4) assigned to players 1 and 2 
in her interaction unit along with her payoff consequences; likewise, player 4 will also be 
informed of what reduction points her partner (i.e., player 3) assigned to players 1 and 2 in his 
interaction unit along with his payoff consequences.  
In this phase, player 3 and player 4 are each assigned an endowment of 40 points. Each reduction 
point a player allocates to reduce someone’s earnings reduces that individual’s earnings by 1 
point and reduces the target’s earnings by 3 points.  
Specifically, if you are assigned either player 3 or player 4, you will be asked to make reduction 
decisions for the following four scenarios (player 3 and player 4 do not communicate prior to 
deciding on the reduction points): 
(a) how many reduction points you would like to assign to a player that sent 10 points to his or 
her counterpart when the counterpart also sent 10 points to that player 
(b) how many reduction points you would like to assign to a player that did not send 10 points to 
his or her counterpart when the counterpart sent 10 points to that player 
(c) how many reduction points you would like to assign to a player that sent 10 points to his or 
her counterpart when the counterpart did not send 10 points to that player 
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(d) how many reduction points you would like to assign to a player that did not send 10 points to 
his or her counterpart when the counterpart also did not send 10 points to that player  
The reduction points to each player must be an integer. They must also be less than or equal to 
20. One of the four decisions will be applied for player 1 and player 2 based on the two players’ 
actual sending decisions. Player 3 and player 4 will be informed of the actual sending decisions 
of player 1 and player 2 in Phase 1 at the end of the experiment. 
Once both players 3 and 4 press the “OK” button to submit their reduction amounts, they will be 
informed of what reduction points their partner assigned along with the payoff consequences.  
How to calculate earnings: 
Earnings of player 1 are calculated as: 
Player 1’s earnings in Phase 1 
 
minus 
 
Reduction amounts received from player 3 or 4 
 
If the earnings are negative, then the earnings will be 0. Earnings of player 2 are calculated with 
the same formula. 
Earnings of player 3 are calculated as: 
40 – reduction points assigned to player 1 – reduction points assigned to player 2. 
Earnings of player 4 are calculated with the same formula. 
Comprehension Questions: 
 
1.  At the beginning of the experiment, you are assigned either players 1, 2, 3 or 4. Answer the 
following questions. 
 
(a) What is the probability that you are assigned a role of player 1? 
[                                               ] 
 
(b) What is the probability that you are assigned a role of player 3 or player 4? 
[                                               ] 
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2. Suppose that player 1 in a group sends 10 points to player 2, and player 2 does not send 10 
points to player 1. What are the interim earnings of player 1? What are the interim earnings of 
player 2? 
 
[                                               ] 
 
3. Suppose that player 4 decides to impose 3 reduction points to a member. How many points are 
deducted from the earnings of the target? How many points are deducted from the earnings of 
player 4? 
 
Any questions? Once all questions are answered, we will start the experiment. 
 
 
[Subjects were asked to answer these control questions. After that, the experimenter explained 
the answers using a whiteboard in order to make sure that the subjects understood the experiment 
fully.] 
 
[Subjects answered open-ended questions at the end of the experiment. Although these 
instructions contained much information, no subjects commented that the instructions were 
unclear.]  
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Appendix C: Theoretical Analysis based on the Fehr-Schmidt (1999) model 
In this part of the Appendix, I summarize how the inequity-averse preference model by Fehr and 
Schmidt (1999) predicts the punishment behaviors of third party players. The Fehr-Schmidt 
(1999) utility function is given as follows: for a list of n players’ material payoffs (x), player i 
receives the following utility: 
 𝑈𝑖(𝑥) = 𝑥𝑖 − 𝛼𝑖
1
𝑛−1
∑ max{𝑥𝑗 − 𝑥𝑖 , 0}𝑗≠𝑖 − 𝛽𝑖
1
𝑛−1
∑ max{𝑥𝑖 − 𝑥𝑗 , 0}𝑗≠𝑖 . (0) 
Here, xi is the material payoff of player i, 𝛽𝑖 ≤ 𝛼𝑖 and 0 ≤ 𝛽𝑖 < 1. 𝛼𝑖 indicates player i’s 
aversion to disadvantageous inequality, while 𝛽𝑖 indicates player i’s aversion to advantageous 
inequality. In the theoretical analyses below, I use a continuous interval for i’s punishment 
activities for simplicity, although a discrete interval {0, 1, …, 20} is used as the choice space in 
the experiment. 
C.1. The Standard Treatment 
As explained below, for the Standard treatment, in which a third party player i’s action choice is 
never revealed to her matched punisher, (a) i imposes positive punishment points on a cooperator 
in Scenario CC when 𝛼𝑖 is sufficiently large; (b) i never punishes a cooperator in Scenario CD, 
while i punishes a defector if 𝛼𝑖 +
𝛽𝑖
2
 is sufficiently large in Scenario DC, and (c) i never 
punishes a defector in Scenario DD. 
 
(a) i’s Punishment Behavior in Scenario CC 
 Third party player i makes punishment decisions with the strategy method (see Section 2 
of the paper). Because of this procedure, i will impose the same punishment points on two 
cooperators and receive the following utility if this scenario happens: 
𝑈𝑖(𝑥) = (40 − 2𝑃𝑐𝑐) − 𝛼𝑖
1
2
∙ 2 ∙ max{(45 − 3𝑃𝑐𝑐) − (40 − 2𝑃𝑐𝑐),0} − 𝛽𝑖
1
2
∙ 2 ∙
max{(40 − 2𝑃𝑐𝑐) − (45 − 3𝑃𝑐𝑐),0}, (1) 
where x = (45 – 3PCC, 45 – 3PCC, 40 – 2PCC). Here, PCC is punishment points from i to a 
cooperator. Equation (1), by simplifying them, reduces to:  
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 𝑈𝑖(𝑥) = {
(40 − 5𝛼𝑖) + (𝛼𝑖 − 2)𝑃𝑐𝑐, if 𝑃𝑐𝑐 < 5.
(40 + 5𝛽𝑖) + (−2 − 𝛽𝑖)𝑃𝑐𝑐, if 𝑃𝑐𝑐 ≥ 5.
 (2) 
Equation (2) suggests that i will punish (will not punish) a cooperator if 𝛼𝑖 > 2 (𝛼𝑖 < 2).  
Some subjects are known to have high enough 𝛼𝑖 that 𝛼𝑖 > 2. Fehr and Schmidt (1999) estimated 
that about 30% of individuals have (α, β) = (0, 0), about 30% of them have (α, β) = (0.5, 0.25), 
30% of them have (α, β) = (1, 0.6), and the rest, 10%, have (α, β) = (4, 0.6) (also see Fehr and 
Schmidt [2010]). 
 
(b) i’s Punishment Behavior in Scenarios DC and CD 
 In this scenario, three players’ payoffs are given by: x = (15 – 3PCD, 55 – 3PDC, 40 – PCD 
– PDC), where PCD is punishment points from i to the cooperator and PDC is punishment points 
from i to the defector in the i’s group. The third party player will receive the following utility 
based on Equation (0): 
𝑈𝑖(𝑥) = 40 − 𝑃𝐶𝐷 − 𝑃𝐷𝐶 − 𝛼𝑖
1
2
max{(15 − 3𝑃𝐶𝐷) − (40 − 𝑃𝐶𝐷 − 𝑃𝐷𝐶), 0} − 𝛼𝑖
1
2
max{(55 −
3𝑃𝐷𝐶) − (40 − 𝑃𝐶𝐷 − 𝑃𝐷𝐶), 0} − 𝛽𝑖
1
2
max{(40 − 𝑃𝐶𝐷 − 𝑃𝐷𝐶) −
(15 − 3𝑃𝐶𝐷), 0} − 𝛽𝑖
1
2
max{(40 − 𝑃𝐶𝐷 − 𝑃𝐷𝐶) − (55 − 3𝑃𝐷𝐶), 0}. (3) 
Equation (3), by simplifying them, reduces to: 
𝑈𝑖(𝑥) = 40 − 𝑃𝐶𝐷 − 𝑃𝐷𝐶 −
𝛼𝑖
2
max{−25 − 2𝑃𝐶𝐷 + 𝑃𝐷𝐶 , 0} −
𝛼𝑖
2
max{15 − 2𝑃𝐷𝐶 + 𝑃𝐶𝐷, 0} −
𝛽𝑖
2
max{25 + 2𝑃𝐶𝐷 − 𝑃𝐷𝐶 , 0} −
𝛽𝑖
2
max{−15 + 2𝑃𝐷𝐶 − 𝑃𝐶𝐷, 0}. (4) 
Equation (4) means we need to consider three cases to analyze i’s punishment behavior. 
Case 1:  15 − 2𝑃𝐷𝐶 + 𝑃𝐶𝐷 > 0 
In this case, 25 + 2𝑃𝐶𝐷 − 𝑃𝐷𝐶 > 0 because 25 + 2𝑃𝐶𝐷 − 𝑃𝐷𝐶 > 25 + 2𝑃𝐶𝐷 −
15
2
−
𝑃𝐶𝐷
2
=
35
2
+
3𝑃𝐶𝐷
2
> 0. Thus, Equation (4) can be simplified as follows: 
 𝑈𝑖(𝑥) = 40 −
15𝛼𝑖
2
−
25𝛽𝑖
2
+ (−1 −
𝛼𝑖
2
− 𝛽𝑖) 𝑃𝐶𝐷 + (−1 + 𝛼𝑖 +
𝛽𝑖
2
)𝑃𝐷𝐶. (5) 
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As 
𝑑𝑈𝑖
𝑑𝑃𝐶𝐷
= −1 −
𝛼𝑖
2
− 𝛽𝑖 < 0, i never punishes a cooperator in Scenario CD. By contrast, i will 
punish (will not punish) a defector in Scenario DC if 𝛼𝑖 +
𝛽𝑖
2
 > 1 (𝛼𝑖 +
𝛽𝑖
2
 < 1). 
Case 2: 15 − 2𝑃𝐷𝐶 + 𝑃𝐶𝐷 ≤ 0 and 25 + 2𝑃𝐶𝐷 − 𝑃𝐷𝐶 > 0. 
In this case, Equation (4) can be simplified as follows: 
 𝑈𝑖(𝑥) = 40 − 5𝛽𝑖 + (−1 −
𝛽𝑖
2
) 𝑃𝐶𝐷 + (−1 −
𝛽𝑖
2
)𝑃𝐷𝐶. (6) 
As 
𝑑𝑈𝑖
𝑑𝑃𝐶𝐷
< 0 and 
𝑑𝑈𝑖
𝑑𝑃𝐷𝐶
< 0, 𝑃𝐶𝐷 = 0 and 𝑃𝐷𝐶 = 7.5 as 15 − 2𝑃𝐷𝐶 + 𝑃𝐶𝐷 ≤ 0. Note that this case 
happens as the boundary between Case 1 and Case 2 (15 − 2𝑃𝐷𝐶 + 𝑃𝐶𝐷 = 0). 
Case 3: 15 − 2𝑃𝐷𝐶 + 𝑃𝐶𝐷 ≤ 0 and 25 + 2𝑃𝐶𝐷 − 𝑃𝐷𝐶 ≤ 0. 
 This case never happens as PDC ≤ 20 in this experiment. 
These analyses show that i never punishes a cooperator in Scenario CD, while i will punish (will 
not punish) a defector in Scenario DC if 𝛼𝑖 +
𝛽𝑖
2
> 1 (𝛼𝑖 +
𝛽𝑖
2
< 1).  
 
(c) i’s Punishment Behavior in Scenario DD 
As is similar to Section C.1(a) above, since the strategy method is used in the experiment, 
i will impose the same punishment points on two defectors and receive the following utility if 
this scenario happens: 
𝑈𝑖(𝑥) = (40 − 2𝑃𝐷𝐷) − 𝛼𝑖
1
2
∙ 2 ∙ max{(25 − 3𝑃𝐷𝐷) − (40 − 2𝑃𝐷𝐷),0} − 𝛽𝑖
1
2
∙ 2 ∙
max{(40 − 2𝑃𝐷𝐷) − (25 − 3𝑃𝐷𝐷),0}, (8) 
where x = (25 – 3PDD, 25 – 3PDD, 40 – 2PDD). Here, PDD is punishment points from i to a 
defector in Scenario DD. Equation (8) can be simplified as follows: 
 𝑈𝑖(𝑥) = 40 − 15𝛽𝑖 − (2 + 𝛽𝑖)𝑃𝐷𝐷. (9) 
As 
𝑑𝑈𝑖
𝑑𝑃𝐷𝐷
= −(2 + 𝛽𝑖) < 0, i never punishes a defector in Scenario DD. 
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C.2. The Visibility Treatment 
When a third party player i’s action choice is made known to another third party player j, 
i behaves differently from how she does in the Standard treatment described in Section C.1. This 
is because i makes punishment decisions, taking the payoffs of five other players (two PD 
players in the i’s group, and j and two PD players in the j’s groups) into account. The differences 
can be summarized as below: 
(I) i’s punishment strength in Scenario CC is on average positively correlated with her belief on 
j’s punishment strength in that scenario. In addition, i refrains from engaging in anti-social 
punishment activities in Scenario CC if i believes that j does not perversely punish a cooperator 
or only mildly does so.  
(II) When deciding on punishment strength on a defector in Scenario DC, i assigns sizable, but 
lower punishment points than one allocated in the other group by the matched third party j’s, 
provided that i is sufficiently strongly inequality-averse. On average, we have a positive 
correlation between i’s punishment of a defector in Scenario DC and i’ beliefs on j’s punishment 
of a defector in that scenario. The average punishment strength in this case is smaller than the 
average punishment strength seen in Scenario DC in the Standard treatment.  
The following is the summary of the theoretical analyses. 
 
(a) i’s Punishment Behavior in Scenario CC 
Suppose that third party player i believes that the probabilities that Scenarios CC, DC (CD) 
and DD are realized are y, z, and w, respectively (y + z + w = 1). Then, i will maximize the 
following expected utility based on the probability distribution and Equation (0), by selecting PCC: 
𝐸[𝑈𝑖(𝑥)] = 𝑦 ∙ [𝑈𝑖(𝑥)]CC in 𝑗′s group + 𝑧 ∙ [𝑈𝑖(𝑥)]DC(CD) in 𝑗′s group + 𝑤 ∙ [𝑈𝑖(𝑥)]DD in 𝑗′s group 
Note that i only knows situations in the j’s group stochastically. This is a more 
complicated optimization problem than the one studied in Section C.1(a). Thus, for simplicity, I 
assume that the following conditions hold for i’s beliefs:  
Assumption A: (i) 𝑃′𝐶𝐷 = 0; (ii) 𝑃′𝐷𝐶 ≤ 7.5; (iii) 𝑃′𝐷𝐷 = 0. 
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Here, 𝑃′𝐶𝐷 (𝑃′𝐷𝐶) is subject i’s belief on her matched third party player j’s punishment points on 
a cooperator (defector) in Scenario CD (DC) in j’s group. 𝑃′𝐷𝐷 is subject i’s belief on j’s 
punishment points on a defector in Scenario DD in j’s group. Assumption A is reasonable. First, 
the cooperator in Scenario CD receives the lowest payoff, 15 points, and 𝛼𝑗 ≥ 𝛽𝑗. Thus, an 
inequality averse third party player would not inflict punishment on a cooperator in Scenario CD. 
Second, if 𝑃′𝐷𝐶 = 7.5 and 𝑃′𝐶𝐷 = 0, j receives the same payoff as the defector in his group in 
Scenario DC. If j imposes more than 7.5 punishment points, he receives a higher payoff than the 
defector. Thus, an inequality averse third party player would not inflict more than 7.5 
punishment points on the defector in Scenario DC. Third, two defectors in Scenario DD receive 
lower payoffs than j (25 < 40). If an inequality averse third party player inflicts punishment on 
the defector in Scenario DD, his utility would decrease. 
In the analysis, I consider the case where 𝑃𝐶𝐶 ≤ 5. This is because when i inflicts five 
punishment points on each cooperator in Scenario CC (𝑃𝐶𝐶 = 5), three players in i’s group 
receive the same payoff (45 – 3 × 5 = 40 – 2 × 5 = 30). With these setups, we can express third 
party player i’s expected utility as follows:  
𝑈𝑖(𝑥) = 40 − 2𝑃𝐶𝐶 −
2𝛼𝑖
5
(5 − 𝑃𝐶𝐶) 
−y ∙ [
2𝛼𝑖
5
max{5 − 3𝑃′𝐶𝐶 + 2𝑃𝐶𝐶 , 0} +
2𝛽𝑖
5
max{−5 + 3𝑃′𝐶𝐶 − 2𝑃𝐶𝐶 , 0} +
𝛼𝑖
5
max{2𝑃𝐶𝐶 − 2𝑃′𝐶𝐶 , 0} +
𝛽𝑖
5
max{2𝑃′𝐶𝐶 − 2𝑃𝐶𝐶 , 0}]. 
−𝑧 ∙ [
𝛼𝑖
5
max{15 + 2𝑃𝐶𝐶 − 3𝑃′𝐷𝐶 , 0} +
𝛽𝑖
5
max{−15 − 2𝑃𝐶𝐶 + 3𝑃′𝐷𝐶 , 0} +
𝛽𝑖
5
(25 − 2𝑃𝐶𝐶) +
𝛼𝑖
5
max{2𝑃𝐶𝐶 −
𝑃′𝐷𝐶 , 0} +
𝛽𝑖
5
max{𝑃′𝐷𝐶 − 2𝑃𝐶𝐶 , 0}]. 
−𝑤 ∙ [
2𝛽𝑖
5
(15 − 2𝑃𝐶𝐶) +
𝛼𝑖
5
2𝑃𝐶𝐶]  (10) 
 
Here, 𝑃′𝐶𝐶 is subject i’s belief on her matched third party player j’s punishment of a cooperator 
in Scenario CC. We are interested in the sign of 
𝑑𝑈𝑖
𝑑𝑃𝐶𝐶
 in order to derive i’s optimal punishment 
schedule. Equation (10) suggests that we need to consider nine cases. 
Case 1: 5 − 3𝑃′𝐶𝐶 + 2𝑃𝐶𝐶 ≤ 0, 15 + 2𝑃𝐶𝐶 − 3𝑃′𝐷𝐶 ≥ 0 and 2𝑃𝐶𝐶 ≥ 𝑃′𝐷𝐶. 
In this case, 
𝑑𝑈𝑖
𝑑𝑃𝐶𝐶
 is calculated as follows: 
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𝑑𝑈𝑖
𝑑𝑃𝐶𝐶
= −2 +
2𝛼𝑖
5
+ 𝑦 ∙
6𝛽𝑖
5
+ z ∙ (−
4𝛼𝑖
5
+
2𝛽𝑖
5
) + w ∙ (−
2𝛼𝑖
5
+
4𝛽𝑖
5
).  
Case 2: 5 − 3𝑃′𝐶𝐶 + 2𝑃𝐶𝐶 ≤ 0, 15 + 2𝑃𝐶𝐶 − 3𝑃′𝐷𝐶 ≥ 0 and 2𝑃𝐶𝐶 < 𝑃′𝐷𝐶. 
In this case, 
𝑑𝑈𝑖
𝑑𝑃𝐶𝐶
 is calculated as follows: 
 
𝑑𝑈𝑖
𝑑𝑃𝐶𝐶
= −2 +
2𝛼𝑖
5
+ 𝑦 ∙
6𝛽𝑖
5
+ z ∙ (−
2𝛼𝑖
5
+
4𝛽𝑖
5
) + w ∙ (−
2𝛼𝑖
5
+
4𝛽𝑖
5
).  
Case 3: 5 − 3𝑃′𝐶𝐶 + 2𝑃𝐶𝐶 ≤ 0 and 15 + 2𝑃𝐶𝐶 − 3𝑃′𝐷𝐶 < 0. 
In this case, 
𝑑𝑈𝑖
𝑑𝑃𝐶𝐶
 is calculated as follows: 
 
𝑑𝑈𝑖
𝑑𝑃𝐶𝐶
= −2 +
2𝛼𝑖
5
+ 𝑦 ∙
6𝛽𝑖
5
+ z ∙
6𝛽𝑖
5
+ w ∙ (−
2𝛼𝑖
5
+
4𝛽𝑖
5
).  
Case 4: 5 − 3𝑃′𝐶𝐶 + 2𝑃𝐶𝐶 > 0 and 𝑃𝐶𝐶 < 𝑃′𝐶𝐶, 15 + 2𝑃𝐶𝐶 − 3𝑃′𝐷𝐶 ≥ 0 and 2𝑃𝐶𝐶 ≥ 𝑃′𝐷𝐶. 
In this case, 
𝑑𝑈𝑖
𝑑𝑃𝐶𝐶
 is calculated as follows: 
 
𝑑𝑈𝑖
𝑑𝑃𝐶𝐶
= −2 +
2𝛼𝑖
5
+ 𝑦 ∙ (−
4𝛼𝑖
5
+
2𝛽𝑖
5
) + z ∙ (−
4𝛼𝑖
5
+
2𝛽𝑖
5
) + w ∙ (−
2𝛼𝑖
5
+
4𝛽𝑖
5
). 
Case 5: 5 − 3𝑃′𝐶𝐶 + 2𝑃𝐶𝐶 > 0 and 𝑃𝐶𝐶 < 𝑃′𝐶𝐶, 15 + 2𝑃𝐶𝐶 − 3𝑃′𝐷𝐶 ≥ 0 and 2𝑃𝐶𝐶 < 𝑃′𝐷𝐶. 
In this case, 
𝑑𝑈𝑖
𝑑𝑃𝐶𝐶
 is calculated as follows: 
 
𝑑𝑈𝑖
𝑑𝑃𝐶𝐶
= −2 +
2𝛼𝑖
5
+ 𝑦 ∙ (−
4𝛼𝑖
5
+
2𝛽𝑖
5
) + z ∙ (−
2𝛼𝑖
5
+
4𝛽𝑖
5
) + w ∙ (−
2𝛼𝑖
5
+
4𝛽𝑖
5
). 
Case 6: 5 − 3𝑃′𝐶𝐶 + 2𝑃𝐶𝐶 > 0 and 𝑃𝐶𝐶 < 𝑃′𝐶𝐶 and 15 + 2𝑃𝐶𝐶 − 3𝑃′𝐷𝐶 < 0. 
In this case, 
𝑑𝑈𝑖
𝑑𝑃𝐶𝐶
 is calculated as follows: 
 
𝑑𝑈𝑖
𝑑𝑃𝐶𝐶
= −2 +
2𝛼𝑖
5
+ 𝑦 ∙ (−
4𝛼𝑖
5
+
2𝛽𝑖
5
) + z ∙
6𝛽𝑖
5
+ w ∙ (−
2𝛼𝑖
5
+
4𝛽𝑖
5
). 
Case 7: 𝑃𝐶𝐶 ≥ 𝑃′𝐶𝐶, 15 + 2𝑃𝐶𝐶 − 3𝑃′𝐷𝐶 ≥ 0 and 2𝑃𝐶𝐶 ≥ 𝑃′𝐷𝐶. 
In this case, 
𝑑𝑈𝑖
𝑑𝑃𝐶𝐶
 is calculated as follows: 
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𝑑𝑈𝑖
𝑑𝑃𝐶𝐶
= −2 +
2𝛼𝑖
5
− 𝑦 ∙
6𝛼𝑖
5
+ z ∙ (−
4𝛼𝑖
5
+
2𝛽𝑖
5
) + w ∙ (−
2𝛼𝑖
5
+
4𝛽𝑖
5
). 
Case 8: 𝑃𝐶𝐶 ≥ 𝑃′𝐶𝐶, 15 + 2𝑃𝐶𝐶 − 3𝑃′𝐷𝐶 ≥ 0 and 2𝑃𝐶𝐶 < 𝑃′𝐷𝐶. 
In this case, 
𝑑𝑈𝑖
𝑑𝑃𝐶𝐶
 is calculated as follows: 
 
𝑑𝑈𝑖
𝑑𝑃𝐶𝐶
= −2 +
2𝛼𝑖
5
− 𝑦 ∙
6𝛼𝑖
5
+ z ∙ (−
2𝛼𝑖
5
+
4𝛽𝑖
5
) + w ∙ (−
2𝛼𝑖
5
+
4𝛽𝑖
5
). 
Case 9: 𝑃𝐶𝐶 ≥ 𝑃′𝐶𝐶 and 15 + 2𝑃𝐶𝐶 − 3𝑃′𝐷𝐶 < 0. 
In this case, 
𝑑𝑈𝑖
𝑑𝑃𝐶𝐶
 is calculated as follows: 
 
𝑑𝑈𝑖
𝑑𝑃𝐶𝐶
= −2 +
2𝛼𝑖
5
− 𝑦 ∙
6𝛼𝑖
5
+ z ∙
6𝛽𝑖
5
+ w ∙ (−
2𝛼𝑖
5
+
4𝛽𝑖
5
). 
These calculations suggest that the optimality conditions depend on i’s belief on the probability 
distribution of scenarios (y, z, w). For this simulation, I assume that subjects’ beliefs are correct 
(i.e., the same as the realized probability distribution in the experiment). In the experiment, the 
percentage of cooperators (defectors) was 72% (28%) – see Section 3 of the paper. Thus, I set: y 
= .72 × .72  .52, z = .72 × .28 × 2  .40, w = .28 × .28  .08. 
Under this assumption on y, z and w, numerical values of dUi/dPCC are summarized as in the 
following table: 
 dUi/dPCC Sign of dUi/dPCC 
Case 1 −2 + .048𝛼𝑖 + .848𝛽𝑖  dUi/dPCC < 0 
Case 2 −2 + .208𝛼𝑖 + 1.008𝛽𝑖  dUi/dPCC < 0 
Case 3 −2 + .368𝛼𝑖 + 1.168𝛽𝑖  
dUi/dPCC < 0 if . 368𝛼𝑖 + 1.168𝛽𝑖 < 2 
dUi/dPCC > 0 if . 368𝛼𝑖 + 1.168𝛽𝑖 > 2  
Case 4 −2 − .368𝛼𝑖 + .432𝛽𝑖  dUi/dPCC < 0 
Case 5 −2 − .208𝛼𝑖 + .592𝛽𝑖  dUi/dPCC < 0 
Case 6 −2 − .048𝛼𝑖 + .752𝛽𝑖  dUi/dPCC < 0 
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Case 7 −2 − .576𝛼𝑖 + .224𝛽𝑖 dUi/dPCC < 0 
Case 8 −2 − .416𝛼𝑖 + .384𝛽𝑖  dUi/dPCC < 0 
Case 9 −2 − .256𝛼𝑖 + .544𝛽𝑖  dUi/dPCC < 0 
These considerations are summarized in Figure C.1 (i’s optimal punishment schedule). This 
suggests that (a) i’s punishment of a cooperator in Scenario CC is on average positively 
correlated with her belief on j’s punishment of cooperators in that scenario and (b) i will refrain 
from such anti-social punishment even though i is strongly inequality averse if i believes that j 
does not perversely punish a cooperator or only mildly does so in Scenario CC. 
 
Figure C.1: The sign of 
𝑑𝑈𝑖
𝑑𝑃𝐶𝐶
 and the optimal punishment schedule of third party player i 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The blue connected line indicates i’s optimal punishment schedule if . 368𝛼𝑖 + 1.168𝛽𝑖 > 2. The red line 
indicates i’s optimal punishment schedule if . 368𝛼𝑖 + 1.168𝛽𝑖 < 2. Note that . 368𝛼𝑖 + 1.168𝛽𝑖 > 2 holds if (α, β) 
= (4, 0.6). 
Belief (𝑃′𝐶𝐶) 
PCC 
𝑷𝑪𝑪 = 𝑷′𝑪𝑪 
𝑷𝑪𝑪 = 𝟓 
𝑷𝑪𝑪 =
𝟑
𝟐
𝑷′𝑪𝑪 −
𝟓
𝟐
 
Case 1 
Case 6 
Case 5 
Case 4 
Case 9 
𝑑𝑈𝑖
𝑑𝑃𝐶𝐶
< 0 
𝑑𝑈𝑖
𝑑𝑃𝐶𝐶
< 0 
 
𝑷𝑪𝑪 =
𝟑
𝟐
 𝑷′𝑫𝑪 −
𝟏𝟓
𝟐
  
𝑑𝑈𝑖
𝑑𝑃𝐶𝐶
< 0 
 
𝑑𝑈𝑖
𝑑𝑃𝐶𝐶
< 0 
𝑑𝑈𝑖
𝑑𝑃𝐶𝐶
< 0 if .368𝛼𝑖 + 1.168𝛽𝑖 < 2 
 
𝑑𝑈𝑖
𝑑𝑃𝐶𝐶
> 0 if .368𝛼𝑖 + 1.168𝛽𝑖 > 2  
 
Case 3 
𝑑𝑈𝑖
𝑑𝑃𝐶𝐶
< 0 
 
𝑷𝑪𝑪 =
𝟏
𝟐
 𝑷′𝑫𝑪  
𝑑𝑈𝑖
𝑑𝑃𝐶𝐶
< 0 
 
Case 2 
𝑑𝑈𝑖
𝑑𝑃𝐶𝐶
< 0 
 
Case 7 
𝑑𝑈𝑖
𝑑𝑃𝐶𝐶
< 0 
 
Case 8 
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I also conducted a theoretical analysis regarding i’s punishment behaviors in Scenario 
CC, assuming that i is concerned about income inequality with the five players (two PD players 
in i’s groups, and j and two PD players in the j’s group) on condition that the same Scenario CC 
is realized in the other group (equivalent to the situation where y = 1, z = 0 and w = 0). This 
analysis was conducted because i may care particularly about j’s punishment decision and its 
consequence in the same scenario that i is in. This additional simulation generates a qualitatively 
similar result (i’s punishment in Scenario CC is positively correlated with her belief on j’s 
punishment in Scenario CC; and i refrains from such anti-social punishment when j does not 
engage in anti-social punishment). See Figure C.2. The detailed calculations are omitted to 
conserve the space. 
Figure C.2: Sign of 
𝑑𝑈𝑖
𝑑𝑃𝐶𝐶
 and optimal punishment schedule of third party player i when y = 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The blue connected line indicates i’s optimal punishment schedule if 𝛼𝑖 + 3𝛽𝑖 > 5. The red line indicate i’s 
optimal punishment schedule if 𝛼𝑖 + 3𝛽𝑖 < 5. 
  
Belief (PCC) 
PCC 
𝑷𝑪𝑪 = 𝑷′𝑪𝑪 
𝑷𝑪𝑪 = 𝟓 
𝑷𝑪𝑪 =
𝟑
𝟐
𝑷′𝑪𝑪 −
𝟓
𝟐
 
Case 1 
Case 2 
Case 3 
Case i 
Case ii 
Case iii 
𝑑𝑈𝑖
𝑑𝑃𝐶𝐶
< 0 
 
𝑑𝑈𝑖
𝑑𝑃𝐶𝐶
< 0 
 
𝑑𝑈𝑖
𝑑𝑃𝐶𝐶
< 0 
𝑑𝑈𝑖
𝑑𝑃𝐶𝐶
< 0 
 
𝑑𝑈𝑖
𝑑𝑃𝐶𝐶
< 0 
 
𝑑𝑈𝑖
𝑑𝑃𝐶𝐶
< 0 if 𝛼𝑖 + 3𝛽𝑖 < 5  
 𝑑𝑈𝑖
𝑑𝑃𝐶𝐶
> 0 if 𝛼𝑖 + 3𝛽𝑖 > 5  
 
5 
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(b) i’s Punishment Behavior in Scenarios DC and CD 
 As in the analysis in Section C.2(a), we can derive i’s optimal punishment schedule based 
on the expected utility maximization. As before, I use y, z, and w (y + z + w = 1) to refer to third 
party player i’s beliefs regarding the probabilities that CC, DC (CD) and DD, respectively, are 
realized. I denote i’s punishment points imposed on a defector (cooperator) in Scenario DC (CD) 
as PDC (PCD). In this analysis, I will impose the following assumptions: 
Assumption B: (i) 𝑃′𝐶𝐷 = 0; (ii) 𝑃′𝐷𝐶 ≤ 7.5; (iii) 𝑃′𝐷𝐷 = 0; (iv) 𝑃′𝐶𝐶 ≤ 5. 
As in Assumption A, Assumption B consists of reasonable conditions. For simplicity, we set PCD 
= 0. Notice that the cooperator in Scenario CD receives the lowest payoff (15 points) in i’s 
group.  
Under these setups, i’s expected utility can be written as follows: 
𝐸[𝑈𝑖(𝑥)] = 𝑦 ∙ [𝑈𝑖(𝑥)]CC in 𝑗′s group + 𝑧 ∙ [𝑈𝑖(𝑥)]DC(CD) in 𝑗′s group + 𝑤 ∙ [𝑈𝑖(𝑥)]DD in 𝑗′s group. 
= (40 − 𝑃𝐷𝐶) −
𝛼𝑖
5
(15 − 2𝑃𝐷𝐶) −
𝛽𝑖
5
(25 − 𝑃𝐷𝐶). 
.−z ∙ [
𝛼𝑖
5
max{𝑃𝐷𝐶 − 𝑃
′
𝐷𝐶 , 0} +
𝛽𝑖
5
max{−𝑃𝐷𝐶 + 𝑃
′
𝐷𝐶 , 0} +
𝛼𝑖
5
max{15 + 𝑃𝐷𝐶 − 3𝑃′𝐷𝐶 , 0} +
𝛽𝑖
5
max{−15 − 𝑃𝐷𝐶 + 3𝑃′𝐷𝐶 , 0} +
𝛽𝑖
5
(25 − 𝑃𝐷𝐶)]..] 
−𝑦 ∙ [
𝛼𝑖
5
max{−2𝑃′𝐶𝐶 + 𝑃𝐷𝐶 , 0} +
𝛽𝑖
5
max{2𝑃′𝐶𝐶 − 𝑃𝐷𝐶 , 0} +
2𝛼𝑖
5
max{5 + 𝑃𝐷𝐶 − 3𝑃′𝐶𝐶 , 0} +
2𝛽𝑖
5
max{−5 − 𝑃𝐷𝐶 + 3𝑃′𝐶𝐶 , 0}]. 
−𝑤 ∙ [
𝛼𝑖
5
𝑃𝐷𝐶 +
2𝛽𝑖
5
(15 − 𝑃𝐷𝐶)]. 
The form of this expected utility function suggests that we need to consider nine regions 
(see the figure on the next page). The derivatives (dUi/dPDC) are summarized in the table on next 
page.  
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 dUi/dPDC 
Region 1 −1 +
2𝛼𝑖
5
+
𝛽𝑖
5
− 𝑧 [
2𝛼𝑖
5
−
𝛽𝑖
5
] − 𝑦
3𝛼𝑖
5
− 𝑤 [
𝛼𝑖
5
−
2𝛽𝑖
5
] 
Region 2 −1 +
2𝛼𝑖
5
+
𝛽𝑖
5
− 𝑧 [
2𝛼𝑖
5
−
𝛽𝑖
5
] − 𝑦 [−
𝛽𝑖
5
+
2𝛼𝑖
5
] − 𝑤 [
𝛼𝑖
5
−
2𝛽𝑖
5
] 
Region 3 −1 +
2𝛼𝑖
5
+
𝛽𝑖
5
− 𝑧 [
2𝛼𝑖
5
−
𝛽𝑖
5
] + 𝑦
3𝛽𝑖
5
− 𝑤 [
𝛼𝑖
5
−
2𝛽𝑖
5
] 
Region 4 −1 +
2𝛼𝑖
5
+
𝛽𝑖
5
− 𝑧 [
𝛼𝑖
5
−
2𝛽𝑖
5
] − 𝑦
3𝛼𝑖
5
− 𝑤 [
𝛼𝑖
5
−
2𝛽𝑖
5
] 
Region 5 −1 +
2𝛼𝑖
5
+
𝛽𝑖
5
− 𝑧 [
𝛼𝑖
5
−
2𝛽𝑖
5
] − 𝑦 [−
𝛽𝑖
5
+
2𝛼𝑖
5
] − 𝑤 [
𝛼𝑖
5
−
2𝛽𝑖
5
] 
Region 6 −1 +
2𝛼𝑖
5
+
𝛽𝑖
5
− 𝑧 [
𝛼𝑖
5
−
2𝛽𝑖
5
] + 𝑦
3𝛽𝑖
5
− 𝑤 [
𝛼𝑖
5
−
2𝛽𝑖
5
] 
Region 7 −1 +
2𝛼𝑖
5
+
𝛽𝑖
5
+ 𝑧
3𝛽𝑖
5
− 𝑦
3𝛼𝑖
5
− 𝑤 [
𝛼𝑖
5
−
2𝛽𝑖
5
] 
5 Belief (P’DC) 
PDC 
𝑃𝐷𝐶 = 𝑃′𝐷𝐶  
𝑃𝐷𝐶 = 7.5 
𝑃𝐷𝐶 = 3𝑃′𝐷𝐶 − 15 
Region 9 
Region 3 
Region 2 
Region 7 
 
Region 8 
Region 1 
𝑃𝐷𝐶 = 2𝑃′𝑐𝑐 
𝑃𝐷𝐶 = 3𝑃′𝑐𝑐 − 5 
Region 4 
Region 5 
Region 6 
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Region 8 −1 +
2𝛼𝑖
5
+
𝛽𝑖
5
+ 𝑧
3𝛽𝑖
5
− 𝑦 [−
𝛽𝑖
5
+
2𝛼𝑖
5
] − 𝑤 [
𝛼𝑖
5
−
2𝛽𝑖
5
] 
Region 9 −1 +
2𝛼𝑖
5
+
𝛽𝑖
5
+ 𝑧
3𝛽𝑖
5
+ 𝑦
3𝛽𝑖
5
− 𝑤 [
𝛼𝑖
5
−
2𝛽𝑖
5
] 
 
As in the analysis in Section C.2(a), I assume that subjects’ beliefs are correct, and use: y = .52, z 
=.40, and w =.08 for this simulation. Then, the derivatives dUi/dPCC are numerically calculated 
as in the following table: 
 dUi/dPDC Sign of dUi/dPDC 
Region 1 −1 − .088𝛼𝑖 + .312𝛽𝑖  dUi/dPDC < 0 
Region 2 −1 + .016𝛼𝑖 + .416𝛽𝑖  dUi/dPDC < 0 
Region 3 −1 + .224𝛼𝑖 + .624𝛽𝑖  
dUi/dPDC < 0 if . 224𝛼𝑖 + .624𝛽𝑖 < 1 
dUi/dPDC > 0 if . 224𝛼𝑖 + .624𝛽𝑖 > 1 
Region 4 −1 − .008𝛼𝑖 + .392𝛽𝑖  dUi/dPDC < 0 
Region 5 −1 + .096𝛼𝑖 + .496𝛽𝑖  dUi/dPDC < 0 
Region 6 −1 + .304𝛼𝑖 + .704𝛽𝑖  
dUi/dPDC < 0 if . 304𝛼𝑖 + .704𝛽𝑖 < 1 
dUi/dPDC > 0 if . 304𝛼𝑖 + .704𝛽𝑖 > 1 
Region 7 −1 + .072𝛼𝑖 + .472𝛽𝑖 dUi/dPDC < 0 
Region 8 −1 + .176𝛼𝑖 + .576𝛽𝑖 
dUi/dPDC < 0 if . 176𝛼𝑖 + .576𝛽𝑖 < 1 
dUi/dPDC > 0 if . 176𝛼𝑖 + .576𝛽𝑖 > 1 
Region 9 −1 + .384𝛼𝑖 + .784𝛽𝑖 
dUi/dPDC < 0 if . 384𝛼𝑖 + .784𝛽𝑖 < 1 
dUi/dPDC > 0 if . 384𝛼𝑖 + .784𝛽𝑖 > 1 
 
Based on these calculations, we can find i’s optimal punishment schedule as in Figure 
C.3 (next page): 
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Figure C.3: Sign of 
𝑑𝑈𝑖
𝑑𝑃𝐷𝐶
 and optimal punishment schedule of third party player i  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I also conducted a theoretical analysis regarding i’s punishment behaviors in Scenario 
DC, assuming that i is concerned about income inequality with the five players (two PD players 
in i’s group, and j and two PD players in the j’s group) on condition that the same Scenarios DC 
and CD are realized in the other group (equivalent to the situation where y = 0, z = 1 and w = 0). 
This analysis was performed because i may care particularly about j’s punishment decision and 
its consequence in the same scenarios which i is dealing with. This additional simulation 
generates qualitatively a similar result (i’s punishment of a defector in Scenario DC is positively 
correlated with her belief on j’s punishment in Scenario DC). See Figure C.4. The detailed 
calculations are omitted to conserve the space. 
 
5 Belief (P’DC) 
PDC 
𝑃𝐷𝐶 = 𝑃′𝐷𝐶  
𝑃𝐷𝐶 = 7.5 
𝑃𝐷𝐶 = 3𝑃′𝐷𝐶 − 15 
𝑃𝐷𝐶 = 2𝑃′𝑐𝑐 
𝑃𝐷𝐶 = 3𝑃′𝑐𝑐 − 5 
when α and β are 
large enough that 
. 𝟏𝟕𝟔𝜶𝒊+. 𝟓𝟕𝟔𝜷𝒊 > 𝟏 
. 𝟏𝟕𝟔𝜶𝒊+. 𝟓𝟕𝟔𝜷𝒊 < 𝟏, 
but . 𝟐𝟐𝟒𝜶𝒊+. 𝟔𝟐𝟒𝜷𝒊 > 𝟏 
. 𝟐𝟐𝟒𝜶𝒊+. 𝟔𝟐𝟒𝜷𝒊 < 𝟏, 
but . 𝟑𝟎𝟒𝜶𝒊+. 𝟕𝟎𝟒𝜷𝒊 > 𝟏 
. 𝟑𝟎𝟒𝜶𝒊+. 𝟕𝟎𝟒𝜷𝒊 < 𝟏, 
but . 𝟑𝟖𝟒𝜶𝒊+. 𝟕𝟖𝟒𝜷𝒊 > 𝟏 
Dashed line: when α and β are small 
enough that . 𝟑𝟖𝟒𝜶𝒊+. 𝟕𝟖𝟒𝜷𝒊 < 𝟏 
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Figure C.4: Sign of 
𝑑𝑈𝑖
𝑑𝑃𝐷𝐶
 and optimal punishment schedule of third party player i when z = 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Regardless of the assumption on beliefs, although we observe the positive relationship 
between i’s punishment of a defector and i’s belief regarding j’s punishment of the defector in j’s 
group (Figures C.3 and C.4), the punishment strength is on average smaller in the Visibility than 
in the Standard treatment (Section C.1(b)). Thus, the Fehr-Schmidt model does not support 
Hypothesis 2 in the paper. One reason is that when i increases her punishment of a defector in 
Scenario DC aiming to decrease inequality with j, i’s disutility due to the inequality with others 
in the j’s group could increase (for example, the payoff between i and the defector in j’s group 
under Scenario DC widens). Note that i’s behindness aversion is at least as strong as her 
aheadness aversion (αi ≥ βi). Another reason is that third party player i in the Visibility treatment 
makes punishment decisions, assuming that j confronts with Scenario DC only with probability z 
(j may confront with Scenario CC or DD) – see the analysis above and Figure C.3. 
 
5 Belief (P’DC) 
PDC 
𝑃𝐷𝐶 = 𝑃′𝐷𝐶  
𝑃𝐷𝐶 = 7.5 
𝑃𝐷𝐶 = 3𝑃′𝐷𝐶 − 15 
𝜶𝒊 + 𝟑𝜷𝒊 > 𝟓  
 
𝜶𝒊 + 𝟑𝜷𝒊 < 𝟓 , 𝐛𝐮𝐭 𝟐𝜶𝒊 + 𝟒𝜷𝒊 > 𝟓  
 
Dashed line: 𝟐𝜶𝒊 + 𝟒𝜷𝒊 < 𝟓  
dashed 
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